Risk is no longer a department
17 June 2026 · 6 min read · IFIS TEAM

Who owns the risk when the next major fraud happens in your organisation, the ransomware message appears on every screen, a customer record is leaked, a regulator asks difficult questions, or a whistleblower reveals a scheme that has been running for three years, who owns the risk? Most organisations instinctively point to the Head of Risk. That answer is precisely the problem.
The most dangerous risk in modern organisations is the belief that risk belongs to somebody else. I learned this lesson during an investigation involving a mid-sized company in Kenya some time in 2015. The company had a Risk Manager, policies, committees, quarterly reports, and colourful risk heat maps displayed during management meetings, yet it lost hundreds of millions of shillings through a fraud scheme that unfolded in plain sight. The strange thing was that nobody believed risk management was their responsibility. Everyone assumed somebody else was watching.
The court would later care less about the existence of policies and more about whether people actually followed them. That distincition is critical. Lawyers, Judges and Investigators understand it but many executives do not. A policy is like a lock on a door and the court wants to know whether anyone actually locked the door. That is where our story begins.
The company that had risk reports but not a risk culture
Picture the scene, a slightly overweight finance manager sat comfortably in his office. A tall operations supervisor managed field activities, a young IT administrator monitored systems, and a confident procurement officer approved suppliers. All competent people, experienced, hardworking and yet collectively they created the perfect environment for a control failure.
Nobody intended to commit fraud. Instead, they created something more dangerous. They normalised risk, small exceptions became routine, minor policy breaches became accepted practice, and controls became administrative inconveniences. Soon nobody could distinguish between operational efficiency and control circumvention. That is exactly how most major losses begin, not with criminal genius but with organisational convenience.
Four lessons executives often miss
- Fraud rarely begins with theft but with tolerance of exceptions.
- Cyber incidents rarely begin with hackers. They usually begin with ignored warnings.
- Compliance failures rarely begin with bad people but with unclear accountability.
- Risk failures rarely originate in the Risk Department. They originate in everyday business decisions.
- Risk ownership cannot be delegated completely.
- Every critical process requires a named owner.
- Controls without accountability are decorations.
- Risk registers become meaningless if managers never discuss them.
- Draw one critical business process.
- Use a flip chart.
- Identify every handoff point.
- Mark where assumptions replace evidence.
- Convenience often defeats security.
- Shared accounts destroy accountability.
- Logs become critical evidence after incidents occur.
- Evidence preservation starts before investigations begin.
- Employees recognise warning signs earlier.
- Managers escalate concerns faster.
- Teams challenge unusual activity constructively.
- Accountability becomes part of daily operations.
- Risk ownership becomes transparent.
- Action plans become trackable.
- Incidents become visible earlier.
- Leadership gains a real-time view of organisational exposure.



Comments
No comments yet. Be the first to share your thoughts.