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The role of the board in fraud risk management and forensic investigations

18 November 2026 · 11 min read · Amumpaire

The role of the board in fraud risk management and forensic investigations

A company can lose UGX 2.3 billion through fraud without a single director stealing a shilling. The money may disappear through approved payments, properly signed contracts, genuine system credentials and transactions processed by employees who appear to be doing their jobs. The board will receive a report describing a control failure, management will promise corrective action, and somebody will recommend additional staff training, but the question directors should be asking is far more serious. How did our organisation become a place where someone could steal repeatedly, conceal the evidence and remain undetected by the people we pay to protect our assets?

Consider a realistic investigation scenario involving a local company operating from Kampala, with branches in Jinja, Mbarara and Gulu. The company has a procurement system, an internal audit department, an external auditor and an established board audit committee.

The following case is an illustrative reconstruction, rather than an account of an actual Summit Consulting Ltd engagement. It draws on recognised fraud methods, investigative procedures and legal principles established in Ugandan law and court decisions.

The payment was approved, but the supplier never received it

The trouble began when a supplier called the company's procurement department to complain about unpaid invoices amounting to UGX 284 million. The finance department insisted that payment had been made.

The enterprise resource planning system showed an approved invoice, a payment voucher, an electronic authorisation and a bank transfer confirmation. The procurement officer produced an email acknowledging the supplier's supposedly amended bank account details, and the finance manager maintained that nothing unusual had occurred.

The supplier denied changing its bank account.

Management initially suspected an external cyberattack, but a review of the transaction revealed something more disturbing. The amended bank details had been entered into the supplier master file using the credentials of an authorised employee, and the alteration had been approved by another employee whose access rights permitted such changes.

The accounts payable officer had previously received an email appearing to originate from the supplier, complete with the correct company logo, invoice references and the name of its accounts manager. What made the message convincing was not sophisticated technology, but knowledge of the company's internal arrangements.

Whoever prepared it knew the invoice number, the outstanding amount, the payment schedule and the employee responsible for processing supplier amendments. The critical question was therefore no longer whether the email was fraudulent, but who had supplied the information needed to make it believable.

An internal auditor examining the supplier master-file history noticed that the beneficiary account had been changed shortly before the payment and restored to its original details afterward. Similar temporary changes appeared against other supplier accounts, with some transactions falling just below the company's enhanced approval threshold. That discovery changed the scope of the investigation. A single disputed payment had become a potential pattern of deliberate manipulation.

The board must investigate the system that permitted the fraud

This is where many boards make their most expensive mistake.

They ask management to investigate a transaction that management may have authorised, failed to supervise or helped conceal.

An internal investigation is not automatically defective because management coordinates it, but where senior management could be implicated, the board must establish an independent reporting arrangement that prevents those individuals from controlling the evidence, witnesses or conclusions.

In our illustrative case, the audit committee would need to commission an appropriately independent forensic investigation, potentially involving specialists from Summit Consulting Ltd, with a mandate extending beyond the disputed payment. And indeed, for any investigation assignments we handle, we define the reporting lines to avoid unnessessary leakage of critical investigation hints as data as part of on going client briefing.

The investigative questions should examine who benefited, who approved the transactions, which controls failed, whether the failures were deliberate and whether management knew about suspicious activity before the supplier complained. The board should also demand answers about earlier warnings. Had internal audit identified inappropriate access rights? Had finance repeatedly accepted changes to supplier banking details without independent confirmation? Were employees permitted to create suppliers, amend their details and participate in payment approval? Had previous exceptions been presented to the audit committee but closed without evidence that the underlying weaknesses were corrected?

A board cannot judge the effectiveness of fraud risk management merely by counting reported fraud cases. A low number may indicate strong controls, but it may equally indicate that employees do not report wrongdoing or that management is skilled at suppressing adverse information. The absence of reported fraud is not evidence of the absence of fraud.

The evidence must survive the courtroom, not merely the boardroom

A forensic investigation becomes dangerous when investigators confuse a plausible explanation with proof. Suppose the company discovers that Suspect 1, a finance employee, accessed the supplier master file shortly before the fraudulent transaction, while Suspect 2, a procurement employee, communicated regularly with a telephone number linked to the disputed beneficiary account. Those facts justify further investigation, but they do not independently establish criminal responsibility.

An access log may identify a user account without proving who physically operated the device, a mobile money number may be registered in one person's name but controlled by another, and a WhatsApp screenshot may establish that certain words appeared on a screen without demonstrating who authored them or whether the conversation is complete.

Uganda's courts have addressed these problems. In a 2025 Supreme Court fraud appeal, the court accepted properly authenticated electronic records, including digital user identifiers and IP login evidence, as relevant to establishing the creation and use of electronic accounts. The important lesson is that digital identification must be supported by reliable evidence about the systems that generated and stored the records.

Another 2025 High Court decision involving corruption in public procurement demonstrated how WhatsApp communications and audio recordings could corroborate witness testimony and contribute to a conviction. The value of such evidence lies in its ability to support a coherent account of events, not in the mere existence of a recording.

The board should consequently insist that forensic examiners preserve original electronic records, relevant metadata, audit trails and chain-of-custody documentation. Section 7 of Uganda's Electronic Transactions Act, Chapter 99, recognises electronic evidence while placing an authentication burden on the party introducing it. The law requires attention to how records were generated, stored and communicated, how their integrity was maintained and how their originators were identified.

For directors, the implication is practical. Do not accept an investigation report that merely attaches screenshots and declares someone guilty. Demand an explanation of the evidence, its source, its limitations and the reasonable alternative interpretations that investigators considered. The standards of digital evidence is very high, be prepared.

Follow the money, but examine the relationships

Returning to the disputed supplier payment, the investigation would need to trace the UGX 284 million beyond the company's bank account. The receiving bank's records might establish that funds entered the substituted beneficiary account, after which portions were transferred to other accounts, withdrawn in cash or sent through mobile money channels.

Investigators should distinguish between a transaction trace and proof of beneficial ownership, because money entering an account associated with a suspect does not necessarily establish that the suspect ultimately controlled or benefited from it.

Obtaining protected bank, telecommunications and personal information must also follow lawful procedures. Uganda's Data Protection and Privacy Act, Chapter 97, provides relevant grounds for processing information needed for crime prevention, detection, investigation and legal proceedings, subject to applicable requirements. It does not give a private investigator unrestricted access to another person's communications or financial records.

The forensic team should therefore work with legal counsel and appropriate authorities when obtaining third-party records, while using properly authorised internal data to reconstruct transaction patterns. The most revealing evidence may emerge from relationships rather than individual payments. An employee repeatedly amends supplier details shortly before payment runs, and another employee approves the changes. The same beneficiary account receives funds connected to several supposedly unrelated suppliers. Transactions are split into smaller amounts, supporting documents are uploaded after approval, and particular users consistently override exception warnings.

A properly designed analytics test can identify those relationships across thousands of transactions, but the board must resist a new danger: treating an algorithm's suspicion score as proof of dishonesty. An automated fraud detection system identifies anomalies, Investigators establish facts and courts determine legal responsibility. Those functions must not be confused.

When management is implicated, independence becomes the real test

One of the most consequential Ugandan decisions in 2025 concerned allegations of theft and conspiracy involving company directors. The High Court's Anti-Corruption Division acquitted the accused directors because the prosecution had not sufficiently established their participation or common intention. The decision also highlighted evidential difficulties associated with missing insider witnesses and the distinction between corporate position and personal criminal responsibility.

For boards, the lesson cuts in both directions. A director should not be treated as criminally responsible merely because wrongdoing occurred in an organisation under their oversight. Equally, the board cannot dismiss suspected misconduct simply because the implicated person enjoys executive authority.

Evidence must establish what particular individuals knew, authorised, concealed or personally did. When allegations involve the chief executive, chief finance officer or another senior decision-maker, the board should consider establishing a special independent committee with access to legal advisers and forensic specialists who do not report to the people under examination.

The committee should control the investigation mandate, receive material findings directly, supervise conflicts of interest and ensure that evidence preservation is not frustrated by managerial influence. Where a director is personally implicated, appropriate recusal and independent decision-making become essential. The board should be particularly careful about interview procedures, employee rights, legal privilege, confidentiality and the presumption of innocence. A badly managed investigation may convert a recoverable fraud case into an expensive employment dispute or an evidential failure.

Technology has made the board's oversight responsibility more demanding

Consider another variation of the same scheme. A finance officer receives a convincing voice instruction purportedly from the chief executive, approving an urgent payment to a newly amended supplier account. The recording sounds genuine, but it may be synthetic, manipulated or taken out of context. The board's response should not be to instruct every employee to become an expert in detecting artificial intelligence, it should require a payment process in which the authenticity of a voice instruction is not sufficient authority to release funds.

Changes to beneficiary accounts should require independent confirmation through established contact channels, dual approval should operate at the transaction level, and privileged changes to supplier records should generate alerts reviewed independently of the initiating department. The company should also retain appropriate system logs and periodically test whether privileged administrators can modify or erase the very records needed to investigate their conduct.

An organisation whose system administrators can alter transactions and suppress the audit trail without independent detection has effectively given the same person custody of both the money and the evidence. That is not merely a cybersecurity weakness but a governance failure.

What the board must demand before closing a fraud investigation

A board should not close an investigation because the implicated employee has resigned, some money has been recovered or management promises that the matter will not recur. Closure should be supported by a defensible account of what happened and what remains unresolved.

The board should require:

a)       A quantified loss statement distinguishing verified losses, suspected exposure, recoveries, investigation costs and amounts still subject to verification.

b)       A documented explanation of the scheme showing how authorisation, access, collusion or concealment defeated existing controls.

c)       An evidence assessment identifying corroborated findings, unresolved allegations, admissibility concerns and preservation limitations.

d)       A recovery and legal action plan covering bank engagement, appropriate reporting, civil remedies and potential criminal proceedings.

e)       An accountability assessment addressing individual conduct and supervisory failures without presuming guilt.

f)        A control remediation report assigning owners, deadlines and independent testing requirements to each material weakness.

g)       A wider exposure review examining whether the same method was used in other branches, departments, suppliers or reporting periods.

The directors should then require internal audit to test the redesigned controls after implementation rather than accepting management's declaration that corrective action is complete. An investigation is closed when the organisation understands the loss, takes appropriate action and can demonstrate that the same weakness is no longer operating unchecked.

The board's most important fraud question

A board does not need to conduct forensic imaging, analyse mobile money transactions or interpret every line of a system audit log. It must, however, understand enough about the organisation's money, people, systems and decision rights to recognise when management's explanations are inadequate.

The board appoints executives, approves major policies, oversees risk appetite and demands assurance that controls are effective. Management implements those controls, while internal audit and other assurance functions provide independent assessments.

When fraud occurs, the board's duty is to ensure that the response is proportionate, independent where necessary, legally sound and capable of producing reliable findings.     The directors who ask only how much money was stolen will receive a number while those who ask how the scheme worked, why controls failed, who benefited, what evidence supports the findings and how similar vulnerabilities will be eliminated will receive something far more valuable. They will begin to understand the organisation they govern.

Fraud is the story of the authority, access, silence and failed oversight that allowed dishonesty to succeed and not just a story of a dishonest employee. A capable board does not wait until money disappears to discover those weaknesses but insists on seeing them while there is still money to protect. When an investigation becomes necessary, it protects the evidence before accepting anybody's explanation. Because a board that controls the investigation's outcome before the evidence is examined has stopped exercising oversight and started managing the truth.

Copyright IFIS 2026. All rights reserved.


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