The first thing they stole was time. For nearly two years, a group of insiders siphoned money from the bank, moving it in plain sight. It was a slow, calculated bleed so precise that no one noticed. Not the managers. Not the compliance officers. Not the regulators. When an overworked auditor stumbled upon the first red flag, it was already too late. Ugx. 6.31 billion had vanished. This wasn’t a cyberattack. It wasn’t some hacker typing away on a keyboard in a dark room. The real criminals were inside the building. a) The illusion of money It started with a simple observation: banks move money in bulk, but they verify in detail. That was the weakness. The mastermind a senior IT consultant knew how the bank processed transactions. He understood the batching system used to settle payments. It was designed for efficiency, but it had a flaw: (i) Small adjustments in individual transactions were rarely flagged. (ii) Internal approvals for bulk transfers relied on pre-set automation rules, not manual oversight. (iii) Reconciliation happened at the end of each business day, meaning any temporary gaps in the books would correct themselves overnight. He didn’t have direct access to the funds. But he had access to the system that controlled them. b) The inside men He needed someone on the inside. Someone with banking privileges. That’s where his accomplice came in a trusted mid-level officer in the transaction approval department. Together, they designed the scheme. (i) Identify dormant accounts that had minor balances but were still active. (ii) Modify internal routing instructions to skim money from legitimate transfers. (iii) Move stolen amounts into temporary holding accounts, disguised as vendor payments or refunds. (iv) Use multiple smaller withdrawals instead of large, obvious transactions. (v) Convert the money into crypto and offshore accounts before the system auto-corrected the missing funds. Every day, the bank processed thousands of transactions. The amounts they took were so small that no one noticed. At first. c) The movement of money The fraud depended on speed. The stolen money never sat in one place for long. (i) Stage One The Source Each week, they selected real client transactions moving between corporate accounts. Using internal access, they altered the batch approvals, diverting small amounts typically between Ugx. 500,000 and Ugx. 2 million into a network of shell accounts. (ii) Stage Two The Cleansing The stolen amounts were then moved to temporary internal accounts, labeled as refunds, fee reversals, or system adjustments. From there, the funds were transferred in chunks of Ugx. 10 million to Ugx. 50 million to accounts registered under fake suppliers. (iii) Stage Three The Disappearance The final step was laundering the money through crypto transactions and foreign remittances. They purchased USDT (Tether) a cryptocurrency that mirrored the dollar before converting it back to cash through private money dealers. Once the money reached these accounts, it was gone. Untraceable. For nearly twenty-one months, they repeated this cycle. Stealing. Cleaning. Disappearing. d) The red flag The scam should have worked forever. It almost did. But then, an auditor noticed something unusual. It wasn’t a missing payment. It wasn’t a huge deficit. It was just a pattern something that shouldn’t have been there. (i) Some refund transactions were too consistent always rounding off at Ugx. 10 million or Ugx. 15 million. (ii) The account numbers used for internal adjustments kept appearing in different reports linked to unrelated transactions. (iii) A bulk transfer batch showed the same approval ID across multiple payments an anomaly that should have been impossible. That’s when she pulled the records. And what she saw didn’t make sense. e) Following the money Once the first inconsistency was flagged, the fraud team moved fast. (i) They cross-checked every transaction involving the flagged accounts. What should have been a one-time refund process was recurring, structured, and systematic. (ii) They ran timestamp comparisons on the internal approvals. The same login credentials had been used in multiple locations at the same time an obvious sign of credential sharing. (iii) They tracked the crypto transactions. The moment they saw repeated purchases of USDT through peer-to-peer markets, they knew. This wasn’t an error. This was a fraud. f) The collapse
Case 2: The perfect crime that wasn’t
The first thing they stole was time. For nearly two years, a group of insiders siphoned money from the bank, moving it in plain sight. It was a slow, calculated bleed so precise that no one noticed. Not the managers. Not the compliance officers. Not the regulators. When an overworked auditor stumbled upon the first red flag, it was already too late. Ugx. 6.31 billion had vanished. This wasn’t a cyberattack. It wasn’t some hacker typing away on a keyboard in a dark room. The real criminals were inside the building. a) The illusion of money It started with a simple observation: banks move money in bulk, but they verify in detail. That was the weakness. The mastermind a senior IT consultant knew how the bank processed transactions. He understood the batching system used to settle payments. It was designed for efficiency, but it had a flaw: (i) Small adjustments in individual transactions were rarely flagged. (ii) Internal approvals for bulk transfers relied on pre-set automation rules, not manual oversight. (iii) Reconciliation happened at the end of each business day, meaning any temporary gaps in the books would correct themselves overnight. He didn’t have direct access to the funds. But he had access to the system that controlled them. b) The inside men He needed someone on the inside. Someone with banking privileges. That’s where his accomplice came in a trusted mid-level officer in the transaction approval department. Together, they designed the scheme. (i) Identify dormant accounts that had minor balances but were still active. (ii) Modify internal routing instructions to skim money from legitimate transfers. (iii) Move stolen amounts into temporary holding accounts, disguised as vendor payments or refunds. (iv) Use multiple smaller withdrawals instead of large, obvious transactions. (v) Convert the money into crypto and offshore accounts before the system auto-corrected the missing funds. Every day, the bank processed thousands of transactions. The amounts they took were so small that no one noticed. At first. c) The movement of money The fraud depended on speed. The stolen money never sat in one place for long. (i) Stage One The Source Each week, they selected real client transactions moving between corporate accounts. Using internal access, they altered the batch approvals, diverting small amounts typically between Ugx. 500,000 and Ugx. 2 million into a network of shell accounts. (ii) Stage Two The Cleansing The stolen amounts were then moved to temporary internal accounts, labeled as refunds, fee reversals, or system adjustments. From there, the funds were transferred in chunks of Ugx. 10 million to Ugx. 50 million to accounts registered under fake suppliers. (iii) Stage Three The Disappearance The final step was laundering the money through crypto transactions and foreign remittances. They purchased USDT (Tether) a cryptocurrency that mirrored the dollar before converting it back to cash through private money dealers. Once the money reached these accounts, it was gone. Untraceable. For nearly twenty-one months, they repeated this cycle. Stealing. Cleaning. Disappearing. d) The red flag The scam should have worked forever. It almost did. But then, an auditor noticed something unusual. It wasn’t a missing payment. It wasn’t a huge deficit. It was just a pattern something that shouldn’t have been there. (i) Some refund transactions were too consistent always rounding off at Ugx. 10 million or Ugx. 15 million. (ii) The account numbers used for internal adjustments kept appearing in different reports linked to unrelated transactions. (iii) A bulk transfer batch showed the same approval ID across multiple payments an anomaly that should have been impossible. That’s when she pulled the records. And what she saw didn’t make sense. e) Following the money Once the first inconsistency was flagged, the fraud team moved fast. (i) They cross-checked every transaction involving the flagged accounts. What should have been a one-time refund process was recurring, structured, and systematic. (ii) They ran timestamp comparisons on the internal approvals. The same login credentials had been used in multiple locations at the same time an obvious sign of credential sharing. (iii) They tracked the crypto transactions. The moment they saw repeated purchases of USDT through peer-to-peer markets, they knew. This wasn’t an error. This was a fraud. f) The collapse Within 48 hours, the bank froze the flagged accounts. But the criminals had already sensed trouble. The IT consultant disappeared. Booked a flight out of the country before the investigation was made public. His inside man wasn’t so lucky. He was arrested at his desk. By the time the dust settled, Ugx. 6.3 billion was gone. g) Lessons from the breach (i) The most dangerous fraudsters are insiders. External hackers get the headlines, but internal access is the real threat. (ii) Small thefts add up. No one steals Ugx. 6.3 billion in one day. They steal Ugx. 1 million a thousand times. (iii) Reconciliation doesn’t mean security. Just because a bank balances its books at the end of the day doesn’t mean the money wasn’t stolen along the way. (iv) Crypto is the ultimate escape route. If fraud detection doesn’t happen fast, the stolen money is converted into digital assets and disappears forever. h) The final move The IT consultant made a mistake. He thought he had covered his tracks. Thought he had outsmarted the system. But he underestimated human intuition. It wasn’t a firewall that caught him. It was an auditor with a sharp eye. And in the end, that’s all it takes.
Your smart devices aren’t that smart—secure them!
Smart devices are convenient, but they are also a hacker’s paradise. Your smart TV, speaker, and even refrigerator are potential entry points for cybercriminals. If you don’t secure them, you’re handing over your privacy on a silver platter. Most people assume cybersecurity is about protecting computers and phones. That’s outdated thinking. Smart devices security cameras, voice assistants, and fitness trackers are all connected to the internet, which means they can be hacked. The problem? Manufacturers prioritize ease of use over security. Most smart gadgets come with default passwords that people never bother to change. Worse still, many don’t receive regular updates, leaving vulnerabilities open for years. Hackers don’t need access to your laptop when they can infiltrate your smart home system. Once inside, they can eavesdrop on conversations, access personal files, or even control devices remotely. Case in point In 2022, a businessman in Ntinda, one of Kampala’s highest suburbs, installed a smart security camera system for his home. He felt safer knowing he could monitor everything from his phone. But one night, his wife heard strange noises from the TV, which switched itself on. At first, they thought it was a malfunction. Then, a chilling voice came through the speaker, laughing and whispering their child’s name. A hacker had breached the default credentials of their Wi-Fi-connected camera. The device was wide open to the internet because they never changed the settings from the factory default. Someone, possibly thousands of kilometers away, had access to their home. Evidence and application Cybersecurity firms report that smart home hacks are skyrocketing, especially in Africa, where cyber awareness is still growing. Many people set up devices and assume they are secure, yet most don’t even require advanced hacking skills to breach. To stay safe, always change the default passwords on any smart device. Keep your firmware updated. Disable unnecessary remote access and set up a separate Wi-Fi network for IoT gadgets. If you think your smart home is making your life easier, you’re right. But it’s also making a hacker’s job easier. Convenience should never come at the cost of security. If you won’t leave your front door unlocked, don’t leave your devices unprotected. Your smart gadgets aren’t as smart as you think. It’s time you outsmarted them. Copyright IFIS 2025.
The silent heist – mobile phone theft & money pin exploitation
“Your phone is your financial vault. Lose it carelessly, and you’re handing thieves an open door to your money.” Mobile phones have become financial lifelines. They hold mobile money accounts, banking apps, and access to sensitive transactions. But as convenience increases, so does risk. Criminals no longer need to hack into a bank’s system to steal money. All they need is to grab your phone. Within minutes, they can access your mobile money, reset your PIN, and wipe your account clean. This is not a futuristic cybercrime. It’s happening now. In taxis. In meeting rooms. On the streets. At restaurants. You could be next. How the scam works It starts with a simple theft. A thief spots an easy target someone using their phone in public, texting, or checking messages. In one swift move, the phone is gone. The phone can be snatched from you on a boda boda or car at a traffic jam hold. Once stolen, the criminal’s first goal is to unlock the device. If the owner has weak security, this is easy. Many victims leave their phones without passwords or use simple PINs like 1234. The next step is finding the mobile money PIN. Thieves know people save it in messages, contacts, or notes. If they find it, they access the money instantly. If the PIN isn’t stored on the phone, they try resetting it. Many telecom companies have weak security checks. Criminals call customer service pretending to be the owner, answer basic security questions, and get the PIN reset. Once they have access, they move fast. They withdraw all the money or transfer it to different accounts. Sometimes they convert it into airtime, which they later sell for cash. After emptying the account, they wipe the phone and sell it. It becomes another second-hand phone in a shop, ready for resale. Why this keeps happening Many people assume their phone is safe because they have a PIN or fingerprint lock. That’s a false sense of security. Criminals exploit weak security settings. Many users don’t enable encryption or strong passwords. Some even write their PINs in their phones. Telecom companies make it easy for criminals. Some allow PIN resets with minimal verification. A few basic personal details are often enough to take over an account. Victims react too late. Many people focus on finding the phone instead of blocking their mobile money access immediately. By the time they act, the money is gone. How to protect yourself Secure your phone like a bank vault. Use a strong password or PIN. Avoid common codes like birthdays or repeated numbers. If your phone allows it, enable fingerprint or face recognition. Never store your mobile money PIN on your phone. Do not save it in messages, contacts, or notes. If you must write it down, keep it somewhere safe, away from your phone. Lock your SIM card. Set a SIM lock PIN so criminals cannot remove it and use it on another device. Contact your mobile provider to check if they offer extra security features. Enable remote tracking and wipe features. If your phone is stolen, you should be able to locate it or erase all data. Google’s Find My Device and Apple’s Find My iPhone can help. Act fast when your phone is stolen. Call your bank and mobile provider immediately to block transactions. File a police report. Remotely lock or erase your phone before criminals gain access. Be careful of scam calls. Fraudsters may pretend to be customer service agents. They ask for PINs, passwords, or verification codes. Never share them. If unsure, hang up and call your bank directly. Final thought: your phone is a wallet guard it like one If someone tried to grab cash from your wallet, you wouldn’t ignore it. So why treat your phone differently? A stolen phone means lost money, stolen data, and a serious financial headache. The difference between being a victim and staying safe is how fast you act and how well you prepare. Don’t wait until it happens to you. Secure your phone today. Mr. Strategy
The collateral scam that keeps bleeding Ugandan banks dry
“A good con doesn’t need to be clever it just needs a willing victim.” Every few years, a financial institution gets burned by the same old scam: forged collateral security. The script is familiar a borrower presents a prime property as security, a high-profile valuer provides a glowing appraisal, and a bank officer, eager to meet loan targets, rushes approval. Then, the bomb drops: the title is fake, the valuation is inflated, and the borrower is nowhere to be found. This is not a hypothetical scenario. It happens again and again. The basics of collateral fraud A financial institution recently approved a multimillion-dollar loan to Subject 1, a businessman with a supposedly lucrative property deal. The collateral? A prime piece of land in an expensive neighborhood. The valuation report, prepared by a seemingly reputable firm, showed the land was worth three times the loan amount. Everything looked perfect until it wasn’t. Unknown to the bank, Subject 1 had colluded with Subject 2, a rogue land officer, and Subject 3, a corrupt valuer. The land records were altered, fake titles created, and a valuation cooked to look authentic. By the time the fraud was uncovered, Subject 1 had vanished, leaving the institution holding a worthless piece of paper. The real reason this keeps happening It’s not that fraudsters are getting smarter it’s that banks are failing at due diligence. Here’s what’s going wrong: Blind trust in valuation reports. Many institutions treat valuation reports as gospel instead of a piece of evidence that needs cross-verification. Weak verification of land titles. Just because a document looks official doesn’t mean it’s real. A forged title can look more legitimate than the original if insiders are involved. Loan officers under pressure to hit targets. Quick approvals mean bonuses, but a bad loan is worse than no loan. Rushed due diligence is a recipe for disaster. Internal collusion. Some frauds don’t happen without inside help. Greedy employees play a role in ensuring fraudulent loans sail through the approval process. How to bulletproof your due diligence Never rely on a single valuation. Get an independent second opinion. If the numbers don’t align, dig deeper. Verify land ownership independently. Cross-check with official land registries. Go beyond the digital records and physically inspect land titles. Conduct forensic due diligence on borrowers. Look beyond surface details. A fraudster’s history will always have red flags previous loan defaults, a web of shadowy business dealings, or sudden, unexplained wealth. Scrutinize internal approvals. Any unusually fast-tracked loan should trigger alarms. If something looks too perfect, it deserves extra scrutiny. Audit loan officers. Regular internal audits can reveal patterns of bias or leniency towards certain clients, indicating possible collusion. Final word: if it’s too good, it’s probably a scam The problem isn’t just fraudsters it’s the willing victims in financial institutions who ignore the warning signs. The best protection isn’t more technology or more complex paperwork it’s discipline in due diligence. Slow down, ask the right questions, and stop approving loans on the strength of fancy documents. Because when the deal collapses, the only thing left is a worthless title and a very expensive lesson.
The collateral scam that keeps bleeding Ugandan banks dry
“A good con doesn’t need to be clever it just needs a willing victim.” Every few years, a financial institution gets burned by the same old scam: forged collateral security. The script is familiar a borrower presents a prime property as security, a high-profile valuer provides a glowing appraisal, and a bank officer, eager to meet loan targets, rushes approval. Then, the bomb drops: the title is fake, the valuation is inflated, and the borrower is nowhere to be found. This is not a hypothetical scenario. It happens again and again. The basics of collateral fraud A financial institution recently approved a multimillion-dollar loan to Subject 1, a businessman with a supposedly lucrative property deal. The collateral? A prime piece of land in an expensive neighborhood. The valuation report, prepared by a seemingly reputable firm, showed the land was worth three times the loan amount. Everything looked perfect until it wasn’t. Unknown to the bank, Subject 1 had colluded with Subject 2, a rogue land officer, and Subject 3, a corrupt valuer. The land records were altered, fake titles created, and a valuation cooked to look authentic. By the time the fraud was uncovered, Subject 1 had vanished, leaving the institution holding a worthless piece of paper. The real reason this keeps happening It’s not that fraudsters are getting smarter it’s that banks are failing at due diligence. Here’s what’s going wrong: Blind trust in valuation reports. Many institutions treat valuation reports as gospel instead of a piece of evidence that needs cross-verification. Weak verification of land titles. Just because a document looks official doesn’t mean it’s real. A forged title can look more legitimate than the original if insiders are involved. Loan officers under pressure to hit targets. Quick approvals mean bonuses, but a bad loan is worse than no loan. Rushed due diligence is a recipe for disaster. Internal collusion. Some frauds don’t happen without inside help. Greedy employees play a role in ensuring fraudulent loans sail through the approval process. How to bulletproof your due diligence Never rely on a single valuation. Get an independent second opinion. If the numbers don’t align, dig deeper. Verify land ownership independently. Cross-check with official land registries. Go beyond the digital records and physically inspect land titles. Conduct forensic due diligence on borrowers. Look beyond surface details. A fraudster’s history will always have red flags previous loan defaults, a web of shadowy business dealings, or sudden, unexplained wealth. Scrutinize internal approvals. Any unusually fast-tracked loan should trigger alarms. If something looks too perfect, it deserves extra scrutiny. Audit loan officers. Regular internal audits can reveal patterns of bias or leniency towards certain clients, indicating possible collusion. Final word: if it’s too good, it’s probably a scam The problem isn’t just fraudsters it’s the willing victims in financial institutions who ignore the warning signs. The best protection isn’t more technology or more complex paperwork it’s discipline in due diligence. Slow down, ask the right questions, and stop approving loans on the strength of fancy documents. Because when the deal collapses, the only thing left is a worthless title and a very expensive lesson.
The forgotten cheques –a case of fraud or strategic deception?
Mr Strategy’s Memo on fraud risk Have you ever been accused of a crime you never committed? Imagine waking up to a letter demanding that you refund $590,000 from transactions that happened over a decade ago, which you believed were legitimate. Now, you’re being labeled a fraudster. Welcome to the real world of forensic investigations, where stories are rarely black and white. The case of the ‘missing’ money Let’s call him Subject 1, a former hospitality business owner who walked into a bank in 2022, brandishing copies of old cheques and a mandate letter that allegedly required two signatures for withdrawals. His claim? Between 2006 and 2010, his former manager, Subject 2, single-handedly withdrew funds without his approval. His demand? A full refund from the bank, which, according to him, failed to uphold his company’s mandate. The bank’s dilemma? Records older than 10 years had been purged, as the bank embraced automation. This was a secret known by few insiders which for some reason, Subject 1, got to know and intended to exploit. Another reason I advocate for information classification policies and giving access on a need-to-know basis. Back to the issue. There was no way to verify the transactions by the bank. However, Subject 1 had copies of single-signature cheques enough, in his view, to prove financial loss. He wanted the bank to refund for having honored cheques with one signature contrary to the approved mandate. But something was off. When asked what action he had taken against Subject 2 at the time, Subject 1 hesitated. Subject 2, he claimed, had disappeared. Curious, a bank manager did a quick online search. Subject 2 was not missing. He indicated on his social media status that was working at a hotel in Zanzibar. The bank turned to us for answers. The investigation: Unraveling the deception Using open-source intelligence and digital forensics, we traced Subject 2, booked at the hotel, and checked as guests. After two days of inquiries, met Subject 2 and requested a discussion, introducing ourselves as guests from Uganda. He was fond of Uganda and was kind enough to give us time. As the discussion progressed, we decided to open up and he was so kind to give us open up to us. His response? A mix of disbelief and amusement. “Yes, I withdrew the money,” he admitted. “But with Subject 1’s knowledge. He was often out of the country and authorized me to sign alone. I provided weekly reports. He even pre-approved all the withdrawals.” He wasn’t lying. He opened his cloud account and showed us all the proof. Old email records, retrieved from Subject 1’s former employees, confirmed this. Management reports had been routinely sent and reviewed. So why was Subject 1 pushing a fraud claim? The answer was simple: He saw an opportunity. He knew the bank couldn’t retrieve the original records and hoped they would settle to avoid reputational risk. It was a calculated move a financial bluff. Lessons for leaders Fraud is not always what it seems Paper trails are gold – In business, never rely solely on memory. Proper record-keeping can be the difference between truth and costly deception. If you have where to keep the records, keep them even for 50 years or 100 years. You lose nothing unless you are involved in some financial shenanigans you wish to hide. Fraud claims need scrutiny – Just because someone screams “fraud” doesn’t mean they’re the victim. Social media intelligence is powerful – In today’s digital age, people leave footprints everywhere. Fraud investigators must adapt. The case was closed. No fraud had occurred just an opportunist banking on missing records. Next time you hear a fraud claim, ask yourself: Is this real, or is someone playing the system? At Summit Consulting Ltd, we have a team of experts and are members of the global detectives Your move, strategist. Until next time,
The lie of ‘100% secure’ every system is hackable, here’s how to survive
There’s a pervasive myth in boardrooms and IT departments alike: that with enough investment, training, and fancy software, a company can be 100% secure. The brutal truth is simple every system is hackable. No matter how many checkboxes you tick or how many “best practices” you follow, vulnerability is inevitable. If you’re banking on the idea of perfect security, you’re setting yourself up for a devastating breach that will cost you not only money but also your reputation and, in the worst cases, your business. The myth of 100% secure For too long, cybersecurity vendors and complacent executives have peddled the lie that your network, your applications, and your data can be made impenetrable. This notion is not only misleading it’s dangerous. Security checklists and compliance certifications provide only a snapshot of your defenses at one moment in time. Attackers are relentless, agile, and constantly innovating. They thrive on the very gaps that “perfect security” proponents ignore. Consider the allure of “100% secure” solutions that promise complete invulnerability. These solutions often come with a hefty price tag and the comforting pat on the back that everything is under control. The reality, however, is starkly different: even the most fortified systems have chinks in their armor. Human error, misconfigurations, and evolving threat tactics ensure that no system remains safe indefinitely. The pursuit of perfect security is not only unrealistic it distracts from building a resilient, responsive security posture. The cost of believing the lie Believing that your system is completely secure has real-world consequences. When companies operate under this false assurance, they fail to prepare for the inevitable breach. In July 2021, a cyberattack against a major state-owned enterprise disrupted operations at key ports, forcing manual processing of container shipments and causing a significant economic blow. The organization had invested heavily in security measures, yet its outdated processes and bureaucratic inertia rendered it vulnerable. The aftermath was a chaotic scramble to restore operations, resulting in severe supply chain disruptions and financial losses that rippled throughout the region. Similarly, a well-known financial services firm in Africa recently experienced a data breach that exposed millions of customers’ personal information. The breach wasn’t the result of a sophisticated zero-day exploit it was the predictable outcome of neglecting basic cyber security hygiene and failing to question the myth of complete invulnerability. Companies that operate on the assumption of 100% security are slow to invest in proactive threat hunting and real-time monitoring, leaving them exposed to attacks that could have been mitigated with a more realistic and dynamic approach. Across Africa and indeed, around the globe organizations that cling to the lie of perfect security often find themselves facing costs that run into millions of dollars, lost productivity, and irreparable damage to their brand reputation. This isn’t just about technology; it’s about leadership, culture, and the willingness to acknowledge that security is an ongoing process, not a destination. Why every system is hackable It’s a harsh reality, but here’s the bottom line: every system is hackable. The complexity of modern IT environments means that vulnerabilities are inevitable. Software is written by humans, and humans make mistakes. Even with rigorous testing and continuous updates, new vulnerabilities are discovered every day. Attackers exploit these flaws with laser precision, often before the company even realizes a problem exists. Several factors ensure that no system can ever be 100% secure: Complexity breeds vulnerabilities: Modern networks are a tangle of hardware, software, and interconnected services. The more complex your environment, the more opportunities there are for misconfigurations and overlooked weaknesses. Human error is inevitable: Whether it’s a misconfigured cloud storage bucket, an employee who falls for a phishing scam, or a developer who writes insecure code, human error is the most common cause of breaches. Attackers are adaptive: Cybercriminals continuously refine their tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) to bypass even the most advanced security measures. What worked yesterday might not work tomorrow. Static defenses are obsolete: Security solutions that promise a one-time fix or a static state of protection become outdated as soon as new threats emerge. Your defenses must evolve continuously to counter emerging risks. This is not a call to despair but a call to adopt a new mindset one that assumes breach is not a question of if, but when. Embracing this reality is the first step toward building resilience and surviving inevitable attacks. What happens when the myth of being unhackable fails? Forensic investigations into major data breaches consistently reveal a common narrative: the attackers found vulnerabilities that had been ignored because the organization believed itself to be “100% secure.” One notorious example involves a state-owned enterprise in Kenya that was forced to revert to manual processes after a cyberattack crippled its digital operations. The forensic analysis showed that the breach occurred due to outdated software and ineffective patch management issues that had been swept under the rug by a misplaced sense of security. In another case, a leading financial services firm suffered a data breach that exposed millions of customer records. Forensic experts discovered that the breach was not the result of an unprecedented, sophisticated hack but a predictable failure: the company’s reliance on outdated defenses and a failure to monitor insider activity. The investigation highlighted that even when advanced security solutions are in place, complacency and overconfidence can create the perfect storm for attackers. These forensic lessons underscore a critical truth: no matter how secure you believe your systems are, the reality is that vulnerabilities exist. And when an attack occurs, the damage is compounded by the delay in detection and response, often leading to long-term financial and reputational harm. Here are your survival strategies in an insecure world If the goal of 100% security is a myth, the practical reality is that survival depends on resilience. Instead of chasing the unattainable goal of a perfectly secure system, organizations must focus on minimizing damage, reducing recovery time, and maintaining business continuity when breaches inevitably occur. The most important shift in mindset is to assume
Going deeper into Carter’s fraud case
Every fraud starts as a ‘necessary adjustment.’ Then it becomes a habit. Then it becomes the business model. Carter’s, a beloved name in children’s apparel, wasn’t supposed to be in the fraud spotlight. No serious company loves their brand with the word fraud. Yet, from 2004 to 2009, a scheme so simple yet effective played out under the noses of auditors, investors, and executives. The lesson? Fraud isn’t about genius it’s about exploiting systemic blind spots. Those with more knowledge of how the company operates, and the process flow weaknesses, always identify gaps that they exploit to their advantage. How it happened Carter’s fraudulent scheme revolved around something seemingly innocent sales accommodations. These are price reductions, often in the form of discounts or rebates, given to retailers to maintain a good business relationship. Nothing wrong there. But what happens when a company starts manipulating the timing of these accommodations and reductions in prices? Enter Joe Elles, the senior sales executive at Carter’s, who had a cozy relationship with the company’s largest customer Kohl’s. Every year, Kohl’s received significant discounts. But instead of immediately recording these discounts as expenses, Elles convinced Kohl’s to delay taking them in the company’s books. This did two things: It inflated Carter’s revenues – Discounts that should have been subtracted from revenue in the current period were pushed into the next period. On paper, Carter’s looked more profitable than it was. It created a time bomb – The problem with deferred fraud is that it has to keep escalating. As old discounts were finally recorded, new ones had to be hidden to maintain the illusion of profitability. This wasn’t an accident. It was a structured scheme designed to inflate financial performance, mislead investors, and sustain stock value without actually improving the business. Why it happened Fraud doesn’t happen in a vacuum. It thrives in a culture that prioritizes short-term wins over long-term integrity. Pressure to maintain growth – Carter’s, like any publicly traded company, was under immense pressure to meet earnings expectations. Every quarter had to be better than the last. Bonuses tied to performance – Executives at Carter’s, including Elles, had financial incentives linked to revenue and profit growth. When your salary depends on ‘beating the numbers,’ reality becomes optional. Trust and unchecked authority – Elles was a senior executive who had built strong relationships with Kohl’s. His decisions were rarely questioned. Sales teams trusted him. The accounting team? Kept in the dark. It wasn’t just a rogue employee. It was a system designed to reward manipulation as long as the numbers looked good. How it was investigated Like most frauds, Carter’s scheme didn’t unravel because of an auditor’s brilliance it fell apart when the lies could no longer be sustained. The SEC steps in – The U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) launched an investigation after whistleblowers and discrepancies in the financials raised red flags. Elles cracks under pressure – In 2010, Elles pleaded guilty to fraud. He admitted to the scheme, revealing how he structured the deal with Kohl’s to hide discounts. The stock tanks – Once the fraud was exposed, Carter’s stock price dropped, and investor confidence evaporated. The market had been betting on a lie. Weak internal controls were exposed – The investigation revealed that Carter’s financial reporting process lacked oversight. The sales department dictated financial treatment without scrutiny from finance or compliance teams. Fraud is a Business Strategy Until It’s Not Carter’s didn’t fail because of one bad apple. It failed because it allowed a culture where deception was more valuable than discipline. Investors didn’t ask the right questions. Auditors focused on compliance instead of substance. Executives prioritized financial optics over business fundamentals. Elles went to prison, but the real lesson here isn’t about one individual—it’s about how fraud isn’t caught, it’s revealed when the walls close in. So, ask yourself: How many companies are still running versions of Carter’s scheme today? The ones that get caught aren’t necessarily the worst offenders they’re just the ones whose luck runs out first. Carter’s fraud was clever, but it was small-scale one executive, one scheme, one company. But what happens when fraud isn’t just an internal scandal? What if it’s woven into the DNA of the entire business? Next time, we dive into a case where deception wasn’t a strategy it was the business model. A company that made billions, not by bending the rules, but by rewriting them altogether. The fraud was so massive that even regulators played along until the walls caved in. It was too big to fail until it did. Stay tuned. You won’t believe how deep this rabbit hole goes.
Shadows and Echoes: Uncovering Hidden Deceptions
Every company has its secrets. Undue enrichment is usually part of them. Stories about a top honcho who stole large sums of money through his underhand schemes are always told in the corridors. These honchos move with their heads high as if no one knows anything. That is fraud for you the ability to cover your face from shame. When you steal without being caught, you call it “innovation.” “Shrewdness.” “Brilliance.” “Hardworking.” Exceptional entreprenuerial acumen.” “Street smarts.” And a plethora of so many names. There is a tale told in hushed whispers that echoes through boardrooms and financial corridors. It begins with a promise, glitters with profit, and ends in ruin. Always in ruin. In the next articles, I will profile several fraud cases from across the globe due to the sensitivity of some of the cases we handle at Summit Consulting Ltd. For some cases, we shall share the fraud schemes and recommended fixes to help you prevent them at your organization. In my experience, every fraud has a shadow an imprint left behind by deception and an echo, the inevitable consequence that follows. Fraud is not an event. It’s a system. Fraud is rarely the work of a single rogue employee. It is a culture, a slow erosion of ethics disguised as “making the numbers work.” We don’t just wake up to a financial scandal; it is the sum of unchecked decisions, misplaced incentives, and willful blindness. Take the case of Thornton Precision Components. From 1999 to 2007, they mastered the illusion of success. Revenue was inflated through fictitious sales invoices, and when the numbers still didn’t add up, they reversed and re-invoiced transactions to create an appearance of business momentum. To keep up appearances, they even manipulated accounts receivable ledgers nothing more than Excel spreadsheets camouflaged as financial statements. By the time the deception was uncovered, the company’s reported assets were bloated by 48%. The executives cashed out their bonuses, and when the truth surfaced, the investors were left holding dust. Why do frauds succeed? Frauds follow a pattern. The ACFE Report to the Nations shows that revenue recognition schemes account for 61% of financial statement fraud. The common thread? A desperate need to meet financial targets. Fabricated realities – Fraudsters create false customers, falsify invoices, and round-trip transactions to inflate revenue. Deferred truth – Expenses and liabilities are swept under the rug. Costs are postponed while revenue is booked prematurely. Layered concealment – Fake ledgers, doctored inventory reports, and manipulated financial records create an illusion of legitimacy. Incentive-driven deception – Bonuses, stock options, and career advancement fuel the need to “beat the system.” And the real enablers? Auditors who tick boxes without challenging anomalies, compliance officers who trust too easily, and executives who pressure teams to “find a way.” Where do the echoes lead? Let’s talk about Carter’s Inc., a children’s apparel company. Between 2004 and 2009, a senior sales executive orchestrated a discount manipulation scheme with their biggest customer, Kohl’s. Instead of recording the agreed-upon price reductions immediately, they staggered them, creating the illusion of stronger profits. Year after year, the deception compounded. By the time the issue was detected, the company had over $18 million in misrepresented revenue. What was the impact? Investors lost trust. Shareholders fled. And regulatory bodies moved in, enforcing penalties and tighter scrutiny. Fraud is never just a number on a spreadsheet it’s an echo that ripples through jobs, reputations, and trust in institutions. No more blind spots If you’re waiting for the fraudster to confess, you’re already late. Fraud thrives in complacency. Leaders must embrace proactive detection. Here’s how: Forget the audit checklist mentality. Fraudsters don’t operate in checkboxes. Look for behavioral red flags. Experience shows that 85% of fraudsters show warning signs of lavish lifestyles, unusual transactions, and defensiveness when questioned. Run digital forensics. The most damning evidence isn’t always in financial statements it’s in emails, metadata, and transaction trailsComputer Fraud bytes th…. Incentivize integrity. If bonuses reward revenue without accountability, deception is only a matter of time. The responsibility of leadership Fraud is a system failure, not an isolated act. Your policies, incentives, and oversight, or lack thereof create an environment where fraud either thrives or dies. Understand the fraud diamond (or triangle) and try to manage all four components holistically to reduce the business risk of fraud. Ask yourself: Does your company reward performance without questioning the means? Do your audits follow the surface, or do they dig into the mechanics of transactions? Are you prepared to listen to the echoes of past frauds before they become your own? The fraud you prevent is the crisis you never have to manage. The time to act is now. Let me know if you want any refinements or additional insights.